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THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF TORT
REFORM IN MICHIGAN: AN ARGUMENT FOR
REINSTATING RETAILER PRODUCT LIABILITY
Ashley L. Thompson*
Tort reform became an important issue during the 1994 Congressional Campaign
as part of the Republican Party's "Contract with America. "Since then, many fed-
eral and state laws have attempted to reduce both liability and recovery in tort
actions. In 1996, Michigan passed the Tort Reform Act, encompassing many
drastic changes to state tort law. One provision of the Act, § 294 7, scaled back li-
ability against non-manufacturing retailers in product liability actions. The
Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the exceptions of the law narrowly and the
prohibition broadly, essentially barring recovery from retailers. Since 1996, this
provision has prevented victims injured by defective products from receiving com-
pensation for their injuries from retailers. Unfortunately, many of the defective
products found in the United States originate from manufacturers abroad. If ju-
risdiction over the manufacturer cannot be established in the United States, then
the Michigan victim has no opportunity for recovery. As an example, this Note
will discuss the problems associated with establishing jurisdiction to sue a Chinese
manufacturer Many of the recently publicized defective products were manufac-
tured in China, but victims injured by a defective product from China have found
it futile to sue the Chinese manufacturer. The Chinese manufacturers therefore re-
main protected from liability. As a result, a person injured in Michigan by a
product manufactured in China is unlikely to recover damages for his or her in-
jury from either the manufacturer or the retailer This Note will argue that
Michigan must reinstate retailer liability in order to discourage the importation of
defective products and also to compensate those who are injured when a defective
product does make it to market.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first part of this Note will discuss the arguments for and
against tort reform and will then begin to track its development at
both the federal and state level. Tort reform advocates, and their
championing party, the Republicans, have encouraged reform in
order to reduce "frivolous" litigation.' With litigation costs re-
duced, reformers argued that insurance premiums would decrease
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2009; Kalamazoo College, B.A.
2003. Managing Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Special thanks to
Professor Christina Whitman, Daniel P. O'Neil, George Thompson, Evangeline Zimmerman,
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1. Saundra Torry, Both Sides Tote Up the Votes for Tort Reform Redux, WASH. POST, Nov.
25, 1996, at F07.
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and lead to lower prices for consumer products and health care.2
Despite the counterarguments promulgated by Democrats and
others opposed to the reforms, many Americans supported the
idea, and tort reform became a popular issue. Many states, includ-
ing Michigan, decided to implement tort reform at the state level
in addition to those reforms being proposed at the federal level.
The next part of this Note will focus on Michigan's state-specific
tort reform, including the passage of the Tort Reform Act of 1996
and one of the Act's most radical provisions, § 2947.4 Prior to the
Tort Reform Act of 1996, Michigan held retailers responsible for
manufacturing defects under a theory of implied warranty.5 Once
§ 2947 passed, however, the Michigan courts interpreted the provi-
sion narrowly and as a result, the courts abolished essentially all
retailer liability in product liability actions.6 This part of the Note
will discuss the development of § 2947 through the examination of
several key cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court.
The third part of this Note will focus on the unintended conse-
quence of the decision to abolish non-manufacturing retailer
liability in Michigan. Recent consumer scares from defective im-
ported products have illustrated the potential defects in the state
of the law. If a victim cannot establish jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer, § 2947 makes it nearly impossible for a victim to re-
cover for his or her injuries. This Note will illustrate this
consequence by using China as an example. China makes it a prac-
tical impossibility to serve process on its manufacturers, so
consumer-victims injured by these products are unable to sue the
2. Stephen Labaton, House Panels Begin Work on Torts Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995,
at A19 (stating the Republican position that "costs of products would come down as business
insurance premiums and legal costs decline").
3. See generally Leah R. Young, Tort Reform Drive Seen Advancing at State Level, J. OF
COM., Feb. 1, 1989, at 15A ("Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia will debate
changing their liability laws this year, the American Tort Reform Association predicts.").
4. MICH. COMp. LAws § 600.2947 (2007).
5. Michigan had never adopted the strict liability proposed by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, but only imposed liability through the theory of implied warranty.
6. Coleman v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 475 F. Supp. 2d 685, 691 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
7. See generally Walt Bogdanich, Wider Sale Seen for Toothpaste Tainted in China, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 28, 2007, at Al ("[T]ainted Chinese toothpaste had entered the United States
. . . ."); Darrell Hughes, Is That Toy Safe? Specialty Shops Take Steps to Ease Fears, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Sept. 4, 2007, at 10A ("Mattel's most recent recall of Chinese-made toys contain[ed]
lead-based paint ... ."); Patricia Sullivan, Criminal Probe Opened in Pet Food Scare; FDA Says
Charges Possible; Tainted Pork Confirmed in California, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2007, at A10 ("Five
companies received the contaminated Chinese rice protein concentrate."); Xiyun Yang,
Regulators Tell Importer to Recall 450,000 Defective Chinese Tires, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at
D02 (stating the recall was required "after the company notified regulators last week that the
tires were missing gum strips, a safety feature").
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manufacturer of the product, and under Michigan law, are also
unlikely to successfully recover from the retailer.9 As a result,
Michigan victims are likely left without any possibility for recovery
of damages.
The final part of this Note will suggest that retailer liability
should once again be imposed in Michigan. Without reform, the
strict interpretation of § 2947 encourages retailers to pick the
cheapest available product, but cheaper products may not include
full provisions for safety, making it more likely that these products
will be unsafe for consumers." Instead of the current system, re-
tailers must be given incentives to provide consumers with the
safest available products. Along with manufacturers, retailers are
better equipped than consumers to assure the procurement of safe
products. 1 They are also in a better position to absorb the cost of
defective products through insurance and other risk-sharing
mechanisms.12 Finally, retailers should recognize a legal, if not a
moral, duty to prevent or to remediate the injuries caused when
they unleash a defective product on an unknowing and unedu-
cated general public. 3 In general, the current policy is harmful to
the economy and to Michigan consumers, and reform must be en-
couraged.
8. Jeffrey Gold, Suing Chinese Firms is Exercise in Futility: Many Companies Tied to Gov-
ernment,J. GAZEI-rE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Feb. 11, 2008, at 1C.
9. Coleman, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
10. See Derrick Williams, Note, Secondhand Jurisprudence in Need of Legislative Repair: The
Application of Strict Liability to Commercial Sellers of Used Goods, 9 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 255,
271 (2003) ("If the increased price of the product reflects the costs associated with the activ-
ity, then the natural tendency of consumers to substitute lower-priced products will also
result in greater consumption of safer products, thus, a decrease in total accident costs to
society... If a manufacturer produces a more dangerous product but is not subject to strict
liability, then that manufacturer will not be forced to internalize the accident costs associ-
ated with its products, and the price of those products will not increase. As compared to the
other, more expensive products that are subject to strict liability, it will be those cheaper,
more risky products that will attract customers, and the result will be a misallocation of re-
sources and an increase in accident costs.").
11. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs,
78 HARV. L. REv. 713, 726 (1965).
12. LAURIE HOPKINS, INT'L PROGRAMS COORDINATOR, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM'N, PRESENTATION TO MANUFACTURERS: CONSUMER PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO THE
UNITED STATES: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SAFETY? (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Retorm) [hereinafter U.S. Consu.r . Prod. Safety Cmrnm'nl. available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/vnr/asfroot/export/ProductSafety-EnglishTranscript.html (stating
that retailers and manufacturers can take five steps to ensure the safety of their product: be
safety conscious; employ standards; and use certification, testing, and market surveillance).
13. Aaron Arnold, Note, Rethinking Design Defect Law: Should Arizona Adopt the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ? 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 173, 182 (2003).
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II. THE HISTORY OF TORT REFORM
A. The Appeal of Tort Reform
In order to understand the development of tort reform in
Michigan, it is important to understand why tort reform first ap-
pealed to voters generally. Tort reform advocates began portraying
victims of torts, and the attorneys who represent them, as unscru-
pulous and unsympathetic, while at the same time inciting fear of
the consequences of tort liability.14 This combination of attacks
proved effective and, as will be discussed in the next section, tort
reform gained extensive political momentum.
Martin Kotler is an academic who has studied the manner in
which tort reform has been publicized. He writes that advocates for
tort reform emphasize the fundamental American value of indi-
vidualism to promote their policy changes. 5 First, they argue that a
victim could have protected himself or herself through a contract,
through insurance, or through assuming less risk.' 6 Thus, other
parties should not be held responsible for the failure of an indi-
vidual consumer to protect himself, or in other words, protecting
oneself should be a matter of "personal responsibility."" Since con-
14. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 50 ("The discourse of the
tort reformers invokes traditional values such as self-reliance, personal responsibility and
property rights to castigate the contemporary civil justice system as unfairly redistributive
social welfare and destructive of core American values."). The American Tort Reform Asso-
ciation is one of the premier tort reform organizations. Its website states:
Today, America's $246 billion civil justice system is the most expensive in the indus-
trialized world. Aggressive personal injury lawyers target certain professions,
industries, and individual companies as profit centers. They systematically recruit cli-
ents who may never have suffered a real illness or injury and use scare tactics,
combined with the promise of awards, to bring these people into massive class action
suits. They effectively tap the media to rally sentiment for multimillion-dollar punitive
damage awards. This leads many companies to settle questionable lawsuits just to stay
out of court.
These lawsuits are bad for business; they are also bad for society. They compromise
access to affordable health care, punish consumers by raising the cost of goods and
services, chill innovation, and undermine the notion of personal responsibility.
American Tort Reform Ass'n, About ATRA, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited May 14,
2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter ATRA,
About ATRA].
15. Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of Tort Reform, 59 RuTGERS
L. REv. 779 (2007).
16. Id. at 783-94.
17. Id. at 794 ("[T]he bringing of a lawsuit may be interpreted as a refusal to accept
personal responsibility for the consequences of one's own decisions.").
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sumers have protective options available to them, advocates argue
that it is not fair to require manufacturers and retailers to compen-
sate a victim who chose not to protect himself or herself before
assuming the risk of injury.8
In addition, Kotler asserts that tort reformers portray the victim-
plaintiff as greedy, "simultaneously asking for something to which
he or she is not entitled and refusing to accept personal responsi-
bility for one's own misfortune... ."'9 An example of Kotler's
assertion is illustrated by the writing of Deborah La Fetra, a propo-
nent of tort reform, in her article supporting the tort reform
movement.20 She describes a victim's thought process as "any in-
jury, damage or untoward turn of events in a person's life is the
fault of another, for which a lawsuit could bring hefty monetary
returns."2 1 When attributes of greed and laziness are forced upon
victims of defective products, the victims become increasingly less
sympathetic and the public becomes less willing to pay for the vic-
22tim's "greedy" and "lazy" desire for recovery.
Finally, tort reform is appealing because the entire tort system
has been portrayed as "broken" and a detriment to society.23 Rather
than benefiting Americans, tort reform advocates argue that the
system hurts the American economy.24 Advocates posit that ridicu-
lously high rewards for victims and increasingly frivolous lawsuits
are creating a culture where businesses, including doctors and
other medical professionals, are wary of practicing.2 La Fetra as-
serts that "many vitally important businesses have simply chosen
not to operate in the United States out of fear of litigation. 2 6 She
argues that potential liability and its consequences stifle the econ-
omy. 7 Therefore tort reform, by decreasing liability, decreases the
18. Id. at 793-94.
19. Id. at 800.
20. Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Principles Support-
ing Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REv. 645, 645 (2003).
21. Id.
22. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at 51 ("Reform advocates portray victims of defec-
tive products as whiners who refuse to take personal responsibility for injuries caused by
their own carelessness.").
23. ATRA, About ATRA, supra note 14.
24. Id.
25. La Fetra, supra note 20, at 645, 673.
26. Id. at 645; see also id. at 649 ("The stifling effect of the tort system is not speculative;
examples abound.").
27. Id. at 648 ("Businesses are devoting mole ad miore resources that could be ,ised
for innovation into defensive measures to protect against the risk of huge verdicts .... This
allocation draws resources away from new product designs and other innovations. But busi-
nesses cannot simply reallocate existing resources by gutting research and development. A
certain amount of innovation is required to maintain one's competitive position in the mar-
ket."); see also American Tort Reform Ass'n, Fact or Fiction You Be the Judge: ATRA v. ABA,
Tort Reform
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costs of goods and services, gives incentive to entrepreneurs to cre-
ate new products, and keeps America competitive on the global
market. 8 Under this theory, "American society as a whole benefits
... [from tort reform because] the freedom to innovate and make
mistakes allows entrepreneurs to bring ever-better products to
,,29market ....
According to the advocates of tort reform, those who engage in
frivolous lawsuits in order to win substantial rewards not only get
ahead unfairly, they also sacrifice the economic health of our soci-
ety as a whole.0 Overall, this message appeals to voters and has as a
result become increasingly popular with politicians as well.
B. The Response: Arguments Against Tort Reform
When tort reform advocates began pushing their agenda, the op-
position initiated a strenuous campaign to defend the current
system. They reminded the public that "[c] ommon law tort liability
has developed over centuries to provide a coherent and reasonable
system for assessing responsibility and liability when individuals are
harmed without their consent., 3' From their perspective, the system
deters people from acting carelessly or negligently and promotes
safety by encouraging avoidance of the potential cost of liability.32 In
other words, tort liability works as a form of regulation3 3 "to influ-
ence behavior before the harm ever occurs."34 Furthermore,
http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi/7372_factfiction.hun (last visited May 14, 2009) [here-
inafter ATRA, Fact or Fiction] ("[L]itigation puts America at a competitive disadvantage
internationally.").
28. See La Fetra, supra note 20, at 645.
29. Id.
30. ATRA, About ATRA, supra note 14.
31. Center for Progressive Reform, Tort Reform, http://www.progressivereform.org/
perspectives/tortreform.cfm (last visited May 14, 2009) [hereinafter Center for Progressive
Reform].
32. Id. ("The adverse publicity and financial consequences of tort liability can provide
powerful incentives for actors to change their behavior, ultimately resulting in far less dam-
age to the environment and to the health and livelihood of human beings. Indeed, it is
often said that American regulatory agencies are able to remain smaller and less intrusive
than comparable agencies in Europe and other industrialized nations precisely because the
United States has an active tort system that complements and backs up agency efforts. This
regulatory effect of tort law should hardly be surprising .... .").
33. Id. Advocates for tort reform are fundamentally at odds with this use of the court
system. The National Association of Manufacturers, a group that supports tort reform, writes
on its website that "[l]itigation should not be the vehicle for the imposition of regulatory
regimes on industries or companies." The Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers, ILRP-02 Legal Pol-
icy, 2.05. Tort Reform (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.nam.org/policypositions/.
34. Center for Progressive Reform, supra note 31.
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[n]ot only does tort law provide important safety incentives
for the prevention of threats to the environment and human
health, it also provides a platform for citizens to reach out and
seek public acknowledgment of the problems that harm and
threaten them, but that have failed to attract the attention of
5legislators ....
In addition, tort liability compensates the victims of injuries
through the recovery of monetary awards for economic damages
and non-economic damages. In a judicial system with tort liability,
the manufacturer or retailer will often purchase insurance to cover
the potential costs of recovery. These insurance costs can then be
passed on to consumers through a subtle price increase on all
goods. Therefore, those who benefit from the product (i.e., con-
sumers) help pay for the compensation awarded to those who are
injured by the product.31 In the unregulated tort system, this is
preferable to forcing a few victims to bear the entire price of in-
jury17 if they are deprived of compensation.
The opposition to tort reform also attempted to downplay the
fatalistic assertions made by reform advocates. When tort reformers
posited that litigation was out of control, the opposition re-
analyzed the data3 8 and found that it "overstat[ed] available infor-
mation to create a false appearance of a crisis when, in fact, no
crisis exists." When reform advocates further stated that the cost
of liability was deterring business and slowing down the economy,'°the opposition again refuted these arguments by pointing to recent
35. Id.
36. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of
Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1570, 1579-80 (1991) ("The additional
social costs represented by the uncompensated victim ... or by the manufacturer.., can be
reduced by spreading accident losses among a large number of persons by means of insur-
ance. In general, manufacturers are considered better able to obtain insurance than
consumers, and are assumed to be able to pass on most, if not all, of the insurance costs to
the consumer by raising the prices of products.")
37. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Services, The
Economic Costs of Injuries, (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter Economic Costs of Injuries], available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/
CostBook/Cost ofInjury.htm (citing statistics for the cost of injuries).
38. Lawrence Chimerine & Ross Eisenbrey, Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper 157, The
Frivolous Case for Tort Law Change (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp157/ ("A key proponent of
the view that the tort system has large negative effects on the economy is Tillinghast-Towers
Per-in, a corpany whose clients in-lnde most of the world's largest insurance companies.
Tillinghast (or TTP) has for many years published a report on what it claims to be the costs
of the U.S. tort system. The TTP reports are one-sided.... [After analyzing the methods and
data used by T[P, the authors find that TTP produces] seriously flawed reports... ").
39. Id.
40. E.g., La Fetra, supra note 20.
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studies showing that the rising cost of insurance premiums was not
the result of malpractice claims.' Despite these efforts, the advo-
cates for reform succeeded in capturing the interest of voters and
tort reform became an important political issue.
C. A Brief History of Recent Tort Reform at the Federal Level
Tort reform officially gained recognition as a national issue dur-
ing the 1992 and 1994 Presidential and Congressional elections.4
In 1994, it became one of several key issues championed by the
Republican Party's "Contract with America."43 The Republican
Party Platform argued that tort reform would quell "runaway legal
fees, multimillion-dollar verdicts against corporations and a court
system clogged with frivolous lawsuits."4 Republicans urged voters
that "consumers [too] would benefit [from tort reform] because
the cost of products would come down as business insurance pre-
41. See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the
Delivery of Health Care, 8 E FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL'Y, Art. 4, 21 (2005) (stating that "past
and present malpractice payments do not seem to be the driving force behind increases in
premiums" and other factors, such as the insurance underwriting cycle and industry compe-
tition may be to blame); Todd C. Berg, Cut Rate: Med-mal Insurr Announces 2008 Rate Cut,
MSMS Says it's Proof' Reform Works, 4 MICH. MED. L. REP. 1, 6 (2008) (stating that "one of
Michigan's largest writers of medical-malpractice insurance, will have increased its overall
Michigan medical-malpractice insurance rates by approximately 51 percent between 1993-
2007" despite tort reform beginning in 1986); Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medi-
cal Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 210
(2005) ("[E]vidence suggests that no crisis involving malpractice claims outcomes occurred.
It thus also suggests a weak connection between claims-related costs and short-to-medium-
term fluctuations in insurance premiums.... [Regarding the spike in insurance premiums,]
the more likely explanation is that much of the rise in premiums reflects insurance market
dynamics, not litigation dynamics."); Marc A. Rodwin et al., Malpractice Premiums and Physi-
cians' Income: Perceptions of a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 25 HEALTH AFF. 750, 757
(2006); WEISS RATINGS, INC., THE IMPACT OF NoN-EcONOMic DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN
PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS, AND AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE (2003) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.weissratings.com/MedicalMalpractice.pdf (stating that insurance premiums for doctors
rose higher in states without caps than in states with caps); Press Release, Weiss Ratings, Inc.,
Medical Malpractice Caps Fail to Prevent Premium Increases (June 3, 2003) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.weissratings.com/
News/Ins.General/20030602pc.htm.
42. Alessandra Stanley, Selling Voters on Bush, Nemesis of Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
1992, at Al ("As family values become a less prominent campaign issue, passed over for lack
of popular demand, a battle over legal values may surface in its place."); Benjamin J. Stein,
Tort 'Reform' is a License to Steal, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995, at El5 ("One of the promises that
the Republicans made in their Contract With America was that they would improve the legal
system.").
43. Stein, supra note 42.
44. Tonfy, supra note 1.
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miums and legal costs decline." 4- Republicans declared that con-
sumers would see lower costs in everything from general consumer
goods to health care. 6 The Democrats responded to the Republi-
cans' charges by reminding voters that tort litigation is rare and
has led to significantly safer products for consumers. 7 Representa-
tive John Conyers, Jr., a Democrat from Michigan, told the New
York Times that the proposed tort reform legislation was simply a
"veritable wish list of changes requested by corporate defendants"
rather than a sincere effort at lowering costs. 4s Much to the De-
mocrats' dismay, the issue proved popular and voters responded to
the allegations made by the Republicans. 9
The Republicans gained control of the House and Senate after
the 1994 election and began to push through the tort reforms they
had promised on the campaign trail.5 ° Since the issue was popular
among voters, Democrats were hesitant to appear too weak on
"frivolous litigation" and instead touted alternative methods for
reducing litigation." President Clinton vetoed the most extensive
45. Labaton, supra note 2.
46. Dennis Factor, Editorial, Doctors Need No-Fault Malpractice Insurance, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1994, at 10J (arguing that tort reform would lower health care costs);
Labaton, supra note 2.
47. Labaton, supra note 2 ("Democrats and consumer groups said the legislation
would roll back decades of advances that had led to safer products, and argued that the
sponsors of the legislation had grossly exaggerated the problems in courts . ).
48. Id.
49. Harriet Chiang, Bush Attacks 'Crazy Lawsuits': Presidential Campaign Puts Lawyers on
Trial, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 24, 1992, at Al ("Quayle's public scolding of lawyers
'obviously hit home with the American public,' said Connor. 'They've discovered that lawyer-
bashing wins friends,' he said."); Stanley, supra note 42 ("Recent public-opinion surveys
suggest that Americans viscerally dislike lawyers and feel that society is, in the words of one
Bush campaign focus-group participant, 'sue-happy."').
50. Congress enacted the following laws that included elements of tort reform: the
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998,
the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Act, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and
the Teacher Liability Protection Act of 2001. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at 71-72; see
also Biomaterial Access Assurance Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112 Stat. 1519 (1998);
Charitable Medical Care Act of 1996, H.R. 2938, 104th Cong. (1996); Also in the Nation,
PiTTSBURgH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 14, 1998, at A13 (Clinton signs the Biomaterial Access
Assurance Act); Bill Would Limit Volunteer Liability, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 20, 1997, at A05
(Republicans introduce Volunteer Liability Act); Adam Bryant, Aviation Bill Encourages
Manufacturers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at 20 (Congress enacts the General Aviation Revi-
talization Act).
51. See generally Chiang, supra note 49 ("Clinton favors mediation and other alterna-
tives at the state level to save time and money. But he opposes Bush's proposals for limits on
punitive dauagc and a lcjse pay-al l the cots i-because h,,, he say they will hurt consumers
and the middle class."); R.G. Ratcliffe, Quayle, Ads Attack Clinton, Say He's in "Pocket" of Law-
yers, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 28, 1992, at A2 ("Clinton campaign aide Max Parker said
Clinton wants to reduce the number of lawsuits nationally by adopting alternative dispute
resolution systems, curbing the sealing of court settlements and effective product safety
regulation.").
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tort reform proposals,52 but signed into law several more moderate
bills.
During the 1990s, the American Law Institute (ALI) also pub-
lished the Restatement (Third) of Torts.54 Although not binding,
the Restatement is generally considered a reflection on the current
state of the law.55 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liabil-
ity reflected the dramatic changes occurring at the federal level
and attempted to implement a much more conservative tort liabil-
ity program.56 Once the Restatement was published, however, the
ALI was criticized for suggesting tort reform was more widespread
than reality dictated 7 and few states officially adopted the conser-
vative regime advocated for by the Restatement.5" Despite
criticism, 59 given the influence and national presence of the Re-
statement, its publication remained an indication that tort reform
was on the rise.
The partisan nature of the tort reform debate has continued
into the new century. President George W. Bush began campaign-
52. Lee Ann Gjertsen, Brokers on the Alert in D.C. for 1997, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP.
& CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Dec. 23, 1996, at 6 (President Clinton vetoes a prod-
uct liability reform bill).
53. See generally supra note 50.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (1998).
55. Aaron D. Twerski, Commentary, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Third Multi-Track Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws, 75 IND. L.J. 667, 670 (2000) (addressing the process of writing a
Restatement and stating that "[t]his process of carefully parsing the case law and getting
behind the facade of linguistics is the classic role of restatements. In doing so, we were able
to discover a remarkable consensus throughout the country .... "); see also Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 14, at 92 ("[T]he Restatement project merely updated the law to reflect the 'pace
of American products liability litigation."').
56. Matthew Warren & Cristie Cole, Case Note, Gipson v. Kasey: The Beginning of a New
Analytical Framework in Arizona for Duty Determinations?, 49 ARIZ. L. REv. 785, 788 (2007)
("The Restatement (Third) of Torts, approved by the American Law Institute, includes sev-
eral groundbreaking positions regarding duty and the role of foreseeability in negligence
cases.").
57. Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and the
Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 889, 935-36 (2005) ("What the
Third Restatement did was prove too much.... [The Third Restatement] also caused the re-
examination of the ALI as an appropriate policy-making entity, leading to questions about
whether the ALI is any more qualified to make policy than the courts."); see also Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 14, at 92 ("It is debatable whether the Restatement (Third) reflects state
court developments.").
58. John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New
Cloth "for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. RV. 493, 553 (1996) ("[T]here are only three states which have ac-
cepted the co-reporters extremely narrow view as set forth in section 2(b).").
59. Id. at 502 (addressing some of the most common critiques of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, including "failure to accurately reflect a consensus," using "citations" that
did "not stand[] for the proposition stated," and "falling to provide an in depth [sic] analysis
of the position taken in jurisdictions which were excluded from the co-reporters' majority.").
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ing on the issue when he first ran for governor of Texas, 60 and dur-
ing his two terms as president, tort reform remained in the federal
spotlight.6I During the 2008 presidential primaries, Republican
candidates continued to use tort reform to garner support. 2 In
contrast, Democrats like John Edwards, a former personal injury
63attorney, continued to fight against these Republican efforts, 64
making it likely that the issue will remain contentious for years to
come.
D. A Brief History of Recent Tort Reform in Michigan
Even before tort reform gained national traction, Michigan was
calling into question the necessity of a strict tort liability regime.
When the ALI published the Second Restatement of Torts in 1963,
it adopted a strict liability regime for torts under § 402A.6' Michi-
gan was one of the few states that never adopted § 402A.66 Instead,
the state held retailers vicariously liable through an implied war-
ranty regime.
60. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Glen Justice, Kerry Gains Campaign Ace, Risking Anti-Lawyer
Anger, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A15 ("President Bush ... at the urging of his political
adviser Karl Rove, has made attacks on trial lawyers a central part of his political strategy
ever since his first run for Texas governor a decade ago.").
61. See generally Gretchen Morgenson & Glen Justice, Taking Care of Business, His Way,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at BI (President Bush signs Class Action Fairness Act of 2005);
Richard A. Oppel,Jr., Limiting Lawsuits on a National Scale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, § 4, at 6
("Mr. Bush and Congressional Republicans are poised to back changes in tort law ... ").
62. John Donnelly, Malpractice Curbs Hailed, Faulted: Texas Law Draws Doctors, Frustrates
Some Claimants, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2007, at Al ("On the presidential campaign trail,
Republican Rudy Giuliani has frequently trumpeted the Texas [tort reform] example, saying
it could bring economic benefits and improve healthcare access in other states."); Christi
Parsons & Andrew Zajac, Rudy Runs on 'Results; Hard-Charging Former New York Mayor is Out to
Prove He's More ThanJust 'the 9/11 Guy', CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2007, § 5, at 1 (stating Giuliani
has '12 Commitments to the American People,'" including tort reform).
63. Donnelly, supra note 62 ("Democratic hopeful John Edwards, a former trial lawyer,
has said that the changes hurt the victims of medical errors while doing little to reduce the
cost of healthcare.").
64. Timothy L. O'Brien & Jonathan D. Glater, Robin Hoods or Legal Hoods? The Govern-
ment Takes Aim at a Class-Action Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at BI ("Republicans,
heavily financed by corporate coffers, have sought to rein in the plaintiffs' bar, while De-
mocrats, beneficiaries of hefty contributions from [tort] lawyers ... have maneuvered in
opposition.").
65. Vargo, supra note 58, at 507 ("By 1964, th; process cudminated in the final form of
the present rule for strict liability, section 402A, which applies to all products.").
66. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98 n.1l.5
(5th ed. Supp. 1984) ("[T]he only remaining jurisdictions that have failed to expressly
adopt strict tort liability for defective products appeared to be Delaware, Massachusetts,
Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.").
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As tort reform gained prominence, the Michigan legislature be-
gan adopting tort reform measures at the state level. In 1985, the
Michigan legislature passed a Senate Resolution attributing the
cost of insurance premiums to frivolous civil litigation.67 Soon after,
the legislature passed the Tort Reform Act of 19 8 6 ,68 and later the
Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1993.69
In 1996, the combination of a Republican governor, conservative
legislature and supportive judiciary7" meant that Michigan was able
to pass various tort reforms,7" including its most drastic legislation
yet, the Tort Reform Act.7" This Act abolished joint and several li-
ability and apparent manufacturer 73 liability." Since Michigan had
never adopted strict liability under § 402A, the effect of the Tort
Reform Act of 1996, once interpreted by the courts, was also to
abolish claims for an implied breach of warranty.
E. Tort Reform in Michigan Prevents Recovery from a Retailer
The product liability provision of the Tort Reform Act of 1996
was codified in Michigan Complied Laws § 600.2947(6) . Section
67. Berg, supra note 41, at 1, 6 ("Michigan's experiment with medical malpractice was
born of a 1985 Senate Resolution decrying 'a crisis in civil litigation,' which was causing
'skyrocketing' insurance premiums in 'critical areas' such as medical malpractice.").
68. Todd C. Berg, Different Directions: Medical-malpractice Reform Promised Lower Insurance
Ratesfor Doctors. Yet, as Filings Dropped, Premiums Continued to Rise. So Did Insurer Profits., MICH.
LAWYERS WKLY, July 16, 2007, at 1 (stating the Tort Reform Act put a cap on non-economic
damages in certain areas of law and also required the plaintiff in medical malpractice cases
to file an affidavit of merit or risk dismissal of his or her case).
69. Berg, supra note 41, at 6.
70. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High Courts?, 18-22
(Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 405,
2008), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/405.pdf (stating that Michigan's Su-
preme Court ranks last among the fifty states for partisanship and independence).
71. See 1995 Mich. Legis. Serv. 1994-2003 (West). Governor Engler's reputation as a
tort reformer helped him land a lucrative job following his stint as Governor: he joined the
National Association of Manufacturers, a lobbying organization in Washington that repre-
sents manufacturers and supports tort reform, as President and Chief Executive Officer.
Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers, Biography of John Engler, http://www.nam.org/AboutUs/
MemberAndStaffLeadership/MemberAndStaffLeadershipBios/JohnEngler.aspx (last visited
May 14, 2009). The NAM policy position on tort reform is available at http://www.nam.org/
policypositions/ (last visited May 14, 2009).
72. 1995 Mich. Legis. Serv. 1994-2003 (West).
73. The Restatement defines the apparent manufacturer doctrine as "[o]ne who puts
out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as
though he were its manufacturer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
74. 1995 Mich. Legis. Serv. 1994-2003 (West).
75. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 600.2947(6) (2007) ("In a product liability action, a seller
other than a manufacturer is not liable for harm allegedly caused by the product unless
either of the following is true: (a) The seller failed to exercise reasonable care, including
breach of any implied warranty, with respect to the product and that failure was a proximate
[VOL. 42:4
SUMMER 2009]
2947 clearly abolished retailer liability, with two exceptions for, in
essence, contract claims: retailers would be held liable if they acted
in violation of an express warranty or if they breached an implied
warranty.76 With these exceptions, the Michigan legislature left
room for its courts to interpret both "reasonable care" and "ex-
press warranty" broadly in order to allow for plaintiffs to recover.
At first, it appeared that the courts would interpret the terms of
§ 2947 broadly so as to give the legislation a narrow impact on
common law concepts of what it means for a retailer to exercise
"reasonable care." This interpretation is illustrated by the decision
in Adams v. Meijer, Inc. In Adams, the plaintiff purchased a deer
hunting tree stand for her husband.77 When she purchased the box
from the retailer, it was already open.8 When the plaintiffs hus-
band later assembled the stand, there were no instructions
enclosed in the box. 79 He still used it, however, and was subse-
quently injured when the stand collapsed and he fell at least
eighteen feet to the ground.0 In determining the liability of the
retailer, the court held that:
[A] plaintiff seeking to recover from a retailer must establish:
(1) that the seller failed to exercise reasonable care relative to
the product at issue and (2) that the seller's conduct proxi-
mately caused the plaintiffs injuries. Additionally, the statute
provides that if a plaintiff can establish a breach of any im-
plied warranty, that will suffice for purposes of showing that
the seller failed to "exercise reasonable care" as regards the
product."'
Although the defendants were granted summary judgment, this
court's interpretation of § 2947 allowed for plaintiffs to recover
from non-negligent retailers, as long as a breach of an implied, as
well as express, warranty could be shown.2
In 2002, however, the Eastern District Court of Michigan ig-
nored the broad interpretation of § 2947 in Adams when deciding
cause of the person's injuries. (b) The seller made an express warranty as to the product, the
product failed to conform to the warranty, and the failure to conform to the warranty was a
proximate cause of the person's harm.").
76. Id.
77. Adams v. Meijer, Inc., No. 224213, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 298, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 2001).
78. Id.
79. Id. at *2-3.
80. Id. at *4.
81. Id. at *8.
82. Id. at *8-9.
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Mills v. Curioni.83 The plaintiff in Mills was an employee of a packag-
ing company.84 His "right hand was crushed when the work glove
he was wearing got caught in the feeder roller of the [Flexo-Folder-
Gluer] machine."8 5 In tort, the plaintiff filed a complaint against
both the manufacturer and the retailer of the machine alleging
negligence, defective design and manufacture of the machine, and
86failure to warn. In making its decision, the court first looked at
"the legislative history of Section 2947" which "revealf[ed] the Leg-
islature's intent [was] to limit the liability of sellers only to those
cases where their independent negligence is shown."8 7 The court
granted summary judgment to the defendant retailer and stated
that "a seller's duty under Section 2947 is based on whether it knew
or should have known of the alleged danger"8  and limited to cases
where it was actively negligent because it "should have recognized"
the danger. Contrary to the Adams decision, the court in Mills left
no room for retailer liability.
Following the Mills decision, Michigan appellate courts lacked a
consensus on how to interpret § 2947. Most courts chose to apply a
strict interpretation from Mills9 rather than the more plaintiff-
friendly analysis used in Adams.90 It wasn't until 2007, however, that
the Michigan Supreme Court finally addressed the issue. When it
did, it chose the Mills interpretation."
The Michigan Supreme Court followed Mills in Coleman v. Max-
well Shoe Co., Inc. In Coleman, the plaintiff purchased a pair of shoes
from JC Penney.9 2 Two days later, the left strap on the shoe broke
and she fell down a set of stairs, suffering injuries.3 She brought
83. Mills v. Curioni, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 876 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
84. Id. at 879.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 881; failure to warn is defined as: "where it is alleged that a person was in-
jured by reason of the defendant's failure to warn adequately of a product's dangerousness."
David Polin, Failure to Warn as Proximate Cause of Injury, 8 Am. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 547, § 1
(2008).
87. Mills, 238 E Supp 2d at 886.
88. Id. at 887.
89. See generally Hastings Mut. Ins. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 252427, slip op. at 3
(Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2005) ("[N]o action based merely on a manufacturing defect may
lie against a non-manufacturing seller.").
90. See generally Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2000)
("Because the existence of a defect is generally determined by the negligent conduct of the
manufacturer, a retailer may be held liable for breaching its implied warranty of merchant-
ability by selling a defective product, even if the retailer's conduct is wholly free from
negligence.").
91. Coleman v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 475 F Supp. 2d 685, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2007).




suit against the manufacturer and the retailer.94 Since the shoe
"appeared" to be in good condition, the Supreme Court needed to
determine whether § 2947 required the plaintiff to prove "fault on
the part of the seller" in order to recover from the retailer.95 The
court determined that a demonstration of retailer fault was re-
quired, and in doing so, explicitly accepted the Mills' court's
interpretation of § 2947 over the Adams court's more liberal read-
ing.96
With this decision, the Michigan Supreme Court effectively abol-
ished non-manufacturing seller responsibility for defects caused by
the manufacturer, despite the language in § 2947 retaining a
breach of implied warranty as a cause of action. The court adopted
the language from the Mills decision to the effect that, "it was not
enough for the plaintiff to claim that the product was sold in a de-
fective state, and the defect caused his injury. In order to recover
against the non-manufacturing seller, the plaintiff was required to
show independent negligence on the part of the seller."97 The
court claimed that § 2947 "should be read to require a plaintiff to
prove that the seller knew or had reason to know of a products
[sic] defect."98 The court quoted an article from the Michigan Bar
Journal on Michigan product liability and affirmed that "l[t] he fact
finder's task under the new law should result in a zero assessment
of fault to the nonmanufacturing seller, whose involvement in the
product may have been no more than to place the product on its
shelf."99
The court had interpreted § 2947's exceptions narrowly, and
Michigan would now effectively shield retailers from product liabil-
ity actions. With this decision, the tort-reformers, guided by the
Republicans, succeeded in revamping Michigan's products liability
law as part of their tort reform agenda. Subsequent decisions con-
tinued to carve away at retailer liability.190
Tort-reformers want to see these carve-outs because, in essence,
non-manufacturing sellers do not produce the defects for which
94. Id.
95. Id. at 688.
96. Id. at 689.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Mills v. Curioni, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 876, 886 (E.D. Mich. 2002)).
99. Id. at 691 (quoting Rosemary G. Schikora, No "Apparent Manufacturer" Liability in
Michigan, 75 MICH. BAR.J. 246, 248 (1996)).
100. See generallyJenish v. Monarch Velo LLC, No. 05-CV-73648, 2007 WL 1364789, at
*3 (E.D. Mich. May 9, 2007) (dismissing plaintiff's claim for liability under § 2947).
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they are held responsible.'' A retailer sells the product, but does
not manufacture it, and therefore is unlikely to have created the
defect itself. Negligence liability against a non-manufacturing seller
creates a duty for the seller to investigate the competence of his
manufacturer, even though the seller may not be familiar with the
product or how it is produced. Under this theory, negligence liabil-
ity, and strict liability especially, is extremely inefficient for
retailers. Tort reform advocates believe that instead, liability should
be placed only on the party who produces the defective product
because it has the knowledge and resources to prevent and fix such
defects. °2
In addition, these changes were implemented so that insurance
companies could lower the costs of insurance premiums, allowing
the retailer to sell the product at a more affordable price and save
consumers money.'00 Although the provision was expected to make
recovery more difficult for plaintiffs injured by defective products,
the gains achieved were projected to outweigh the losses. Unfortu-
nately, however, § 2947 also created a dire consequence for
potential victims: without compensation from retailers, the new
provision would now prevent many victims from recovering for in-
juries caused by a defective product.
III. UNKNOWN IMPACT: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE
OF ELIMINATING NON-MANUFACTURING SELLER
LIABILITY IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS
A. Americans Increasingly Import Defective Products
Products sold in America are increasingly manufactured
abroad. 0 4 Many of the inexpensive products we consume remain
profitable because the product, or at least part of it, can be manu-
factured or assembled abroad where costs are lower.' 5 This
101. Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposal for Change, 55
BAYLOR L. REv. 1031, 1035 (2003) ("[O]ne who is in the distributive chain but did not create
the defect should not be liable for that defect... ").
102. Id.
103. Labaton, supra note 2.
104. See, e.g., CONSUMER GOODS INDUS., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., INDUSTRY OUTLOOK:
DOLLS, TOYS, GAMES, AND CHILDREN'S VEHICLES 1 (2006), available at http://
www.ita.doc.gov/td/ocg/outlook06_toys.pdf (stating that the "large-scale production [of
toys] has shifted abroad"); Louis Uchitelle, As Factories Move Abroad, So Does U.S. Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, at BU4 ("More than half of the manufactured goods that Americans
buy are made abroad, up from 31 percent in 1987.").
105. Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at E38; Louis Uchitelle, Spread of
U.S. Plants Abroad is Slowing Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1989, at 1; Venture Outsource,
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increase in consumption of products from abroad has, inevitably,
led Americans to rely more on foreign manufacturers to ensure
that the product is safe.
Recently, we have seen an onslaught of imported defective
products from China. Since April 2007, there have been massive
recalls and media cover of tainted products such as pet food,
10 6
fish,0 7 tires,'0 8 toothpaste, 10 9 children's toys,"0 and Heparin (a pre-
scription blood-thinner)."' Unfortunately, not one of the defects
discovered in the past year were visible to the average consumer.
Practically, this means that when these products were placed on the
market, consumers were deprived the opportunity to assess their
risk for injury before making the decision to purchase them.
B. The Dangerous Relationship Between Defective Products
and Michigan's Product Liability Law
In Michigan, because there is effectively no retailer liability, an
injured consumer must be able to sue the foreign manufacturer in
order to receive compensation for the injury. In some cases, a
Michigan resident may be able to recover from a manufacturer
based on the manufacturer's relationship to Michigan or the status
of the law between the U.S. and the foreign state where the pro-
ducer resides."2 There are, however, situations where it will prove a
Global Hourly Manufacturing Labor Rate Trend Comparison (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.ventureoutsource.com/contract-
manufacturing/trends-observations/2008/global-hourly-manufacturing-labor-rate-trend-
comparison (comparing labor costs across the world and showing that the United States,
Europe and Canada have the highest hourly manufacturing labor costs).
106. Sullivan, supra note 7.
107. Recall is Issued for Frozen Fish, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at A14.
108. Yang, supra note 7.
109. Bogdanich, supra note 7.
110. Hughes, supra note 7; Eric Lipton et al., Admitting Error, Toys R' Us Stops Selling
Lead-Tainted Bibs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2007, at Cl; Eric Lipton & Louise Story, Bid to Root Out
Lead Tinkets Falters in U.S., N.Y. TMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
111. Gardiner Harris, FDA Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2008, at Al.
112. In some cases, Michigan residents may be able to establish jurisdiction to sue re-
tailers in other states, based on the relationship of the retailer to the third state. See Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987); Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761,763-64 (I11. 1961). If the Michigan resident does
establish jurisdiction, however, the third state court will likely apply Michigan law if the acci-
dent occurred in Michigan. See Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 805-06 (Ala.
1892). Most conflict of law rules require that the law of the site of injury be applied, and
therefore a Michigan resident, injured in Michigan, but suing in a third state, will still be
subject to Michigan product liability law. In a few cases, the third state may find public policy
reasons, such as a strong ethic to compensate injured consumers, as a reason to apply their
own product liability law. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918). This
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practical impossibility for a Michigan court to obtain jurisdiction
over a foreign manufacturer.' An example of the effects of an
American citizen essentially being unable to establish jurisdiction
can be seen with Chinese manufacturers; this is particularly alarm-
ing because China is the country from which over 80 percent of
our children's toys are currently imported.'
4
C. China Refuses to Impose Liability on its Manufacturers for the
Defective Products Sold to the United States
China signed the Hague Conventions on Service Abroad of Ju-
dicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial
Matters."5 The purpose of this treaty was to codify procedures for
international service of process." The treaty provides for "service
of process by a Central Authority (usually the Ministry ofJustice) in
the Convention countries.".. The treaty then requires the Central
Authority to distribute the service to the proper party. By signing
this treaty, China ostensibly guaranteed that American consumers
would be able to reach its manufacturers in order to establish ju-
risdiction over them in the United States." 9
Unfortunately for Americans, however, this treaty is of little
benefit to American consumers injured by a defective product.
Since China maintains a high level of secrecy with regard to its
situation, however, is unpredictable and unlikely. It would therefore be irresponsible to
make public policy determinations based on the small likelihood that Michigan residents
could recover from retailers in a third state, especially where the consumer purchased, used,
and/or was injured by the product in Michigan.
113. See Mark P. Chalos, Successfully Suing Foreign Manufacturers, TRIAL, Nov. 2008, at 32,
33-35 (providing an overview of the difficulties of establishing jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer).
114. BarackObama.com, Protecting American Families from Harmful Lead-Based
Products (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
[hereinafter BarackObama.com], available at http://obama.3cdn.net/c63f8c9f9add2832ac-
eboimv54x.pdf ("Over 80 percent of toys in the U.S. now come from China....").
115. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA JUDICIAL AsSIS-
TANCE (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter CHINA
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE], available at http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial-
694.html; Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Docu-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
[hereinafter Hague Convention].
116. SeeHague Convention, supranote 115.
117. Process Forwarding Int'l, Hague Service Convention, http://
www.hagueservice.net/hsc.html (last visited May 14, 2009). Requests originating in the
United States must be submitted on a form USM-94, available at the office of any United
States Marshal. Id.
118. See Hague Convention, supra note 115.
119. See CHINA JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 115.
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government procedures and bureaucracies, it is difficult to under-
stand exactly why, or at what point in the legal process, suing a
Chinese manufacturer often fails. In order to better understand
where the Hague Convention process fails, I have spoken with a
Michigan plaintiffs attorney who attempted to serve process on
Chinese manufacturers.20 He helped me to understand some of
the difficulties associated with the process.
First, compliance with the Hague Convention's terms relating to
translation and service are prohibitively expensive, and practitio-
ners note that China appears to do everything within its power to
evade its responsibility under the treaty.12' When the Chinese gov-
ernment receives service of process through its Chinese Central
Authority, it seems that the service rarely, if ever, reaches the manu-
facturer. 2 Jeffrey Gold, a journalist researching an article on the
futility of suing Chinese companies, found several reasons for the
Chinese government's failure to abide by the Hague Conventions.
Since the country is still officially Communist, many of the manu-
facturers are owned, at least partially, by the Chinese government
and push for immunity based on their relationship with the State.
2
Gold also cites other experts who have claimed that the Chinese
government uses failure of service of process to "retaliate" against
the U.S. for treatment its government regards as unfair.2 4 Regard-
less of the reason given, although China officially asserts that it is a
party to the Hague Convention, practically it appears to consis-
tently thwart the establishment of jurisdiction over its
120. See Daniel P. O'Neil Aff. (March 10, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan
Law Reform).
121. There is very little written about China's compliance with the Hague Convention.
An attorney who attempted to serve process on Chinese manufacturers described the diffi-
culties he encountered. See id. He specifically noted the problems associated with China's
compliance with the Hague Convention, stating:
China has specifically objected to provisions of the Convention allowing direct service
by mail orjudicial officials leaving no reliable, independent method to obtain service.
Instead the process required by the PRC involves sending a request to the Chinese
Ministry ofJustice which will then issue instructions on how service can be achieved.
Id. at 7.
122. See id.
123. Gold, supra note 8 ("Current obstacles arise because the targets of lawsuits are of-
ten companies that are partly owned by the Chinese government or army, or are allied with
provincial governors... their clout can outweigh efforts by the trade ministry to adhere to
international agreements .... ").
124. Id. ("[Tihe Chinese government sometimes obstructs litigation to retaliate when it
believes the U.S. or the European Union is 'poking it with a stick.'").
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manufacturers, effectively preventing American consumers from
recovering from its manufacturers in product liability claims.
2 5
If a consumer does try to sue a foreign manufacturer, he or she
must hire a plaintiffs attorney who will most likely work on the ba-
sis of a contingency fee.126 Under a contingency fee agreement, the
plaintiff's attorney must then have the capital required to cover the
costs of translation and follow-up with the Chinese government
until the case is closed. This is prohibitively expensive when there
is little guarantee for success and a recovery of costs, meaning that
most plaintiffs attorneys will be unable to take on such a case.121
The legislative history of Michigan's tort reform indicates that
the goal of the reform was to reduce the number of frivolous
lawsuits, reduce the consequences of large recoveries and stop
non-manufacturing sellers from being held responsible for defects
they did not create. The Legislature did not intend to prevent
Michigan victims from recovery. Unfortunately, the failure of the
Legislature to foresee the problems associated with foreign manu-
facturing and product liability created a harsh and unintended
consequence for victims.129
125. See id. ("Experts in International law say they know of no case in which Americans
collected any money form a verdict or court order against a Chinese company, although
some have been paid through settlements.").
126. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 338 (8th ed. 2004) defines a contingent fee as "[a] fee
charged for a lawyer's services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of
court. Contingent fees are usu[ally] calculated as a percentage of the client's net recovery
" An article in an American Bar Association publication states that a contingency fee is
"[f]requently used in personal injury and collection matters .... It is particularly useful for
the lawyer skilled at analyzing cases and accepting those with a high likelihood of success."
Edward Poll, Flat Fees and Contingency Fees-Do They "Fix" Hourly Rates, LAW PRACTICE TODAY,
June 2007, (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, available at
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/fin06071.shtml.
127. Center for Progressive Reform, supra note 31 ("Plaintiffs lawyers do frequently
take cases on a contingency fee basis, which helps to increase access to the courts among
poor plaintiffs, but the financial risk inherent in that approach ensures that lawyers under-
take a careful screening of cases to pursue only claims that are likely to succeed on the
merits.").
128. This is generally the justification for abolishing retailer liability. See, e.g., Sachs, su-
pra note 101, at 1036-37.
129. Sachs, a proponent of tort reform, concedes this point in his article. He writes,
The thesis of this Article, however, is that one who is in the distributive chain but did
not create the defect should not be liable for that defect, nor be required to incur
substantial legal fees and other expenses as a party to a lawsuit, as long as the creator of
the defect or the creator's insurer is available to satisfy a judgment.
Id. at 1035 (emphasis added). He continues:
Seller liability is justified where the plaintiffs damages are caused by a product defect
and the seller's presence in the case is necessary to permit the plaintiff to recover for
those damages. Since distributors, retailers, and other sellers enter the chain of dis-
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IV. SUGGESTION FOR REFORM: REINSTATE RETAILER/SELLER
LIABILITY IN MICHIGAN
Historically, "strict liability is the public response that is to be
expected whenever the society of a given time and place must deal
with specific perils which it has come to recognize as serious
threats to its welfare." 13 0 As the past year has illustrated, importing
defective products has become such a threat to our society's wel-
fare.13 The federal government may eventually tackle the concerns
associated with this issue,3 2 but in the meantime, Michigan must
change its current product liability scheme in order to offer more
protection to its citizens. Pragmatic public policy concerns illus-
trate the need for Michigan to repeal (or re-interpret) the current
law, § 600.2947(6), and reinstate non-manufacturer retailer liability
in this state.
A. Lack of Retailer Liability Imposes Taxpayer Costs
Imposing liability on retailers will also save money for the gov-
ernment and taxpayers. Without liability, "if the law d[oes] not
secure payment for the costs to the victim, those costs might
tribution with the aim of making a profit from their involvement in the distribution
process, they should not be heard to complain if they are held responsible for defects
in the products they sell when the plaintiff has no means of recovery from the manu-
facturer.
Id. at 1036. Sachs' conclusion is that the seller should be released from liability where the
manufacturer is "identified, is subject to jurisdiction, can be served with process, and is able
... fully to satisfy ajudgment." Id. at 1048.
130. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of
Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1970-71).
131. See, e.g., Bogandich, supra note 7; Hughes, supra note 7; Yang supra note 7.
132. In 2007, President Bush established the Interagency Working Group on Import
Safety. You can see the Agency's work at the website www.importsafety.gov (last visited May
14, 2009). Senator Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New York, has been a leader in call-
ing for consumer protection. He was quoted as saying, "'There is no question that too many
Chinese manufacturers and food producers put the bottom line ahead of safety.... We
need stricter standards, more thorough inspections, and harsher penalties for Chinese
companies and American shippers that turn a blind eye to safety.'" James Bacchus, Com-
mentary, Tainted Imports from China: WTO Obligations Still Apply, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REv., Sept.
17, 2007, at A5. Schumer has also "called for the creation of an import czar who would have
authority over the inspection of goods imported to the United States." Richard Clough, Toy
Makers Brace for Backlash From Mattel's Disaster, L.A. Bus. J., Aug. 20, 2007, at 5. President
Barack Obama has also encouraged more protection against imported defective products.
BarackObama.com, supra note 114 ("Obama will build on his long-standing commitment to
removing lead from children's products and homes to ensure that all American children are
given the best opportunity to succeed in the future and he will push China and other ex-
porters to enforce product health and safety standards.").
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ultimately require public financing.' 33 This is the current situation
in Michigan. If a victim survives an injury from a defective product,
but is severely injured, he or she may be unable to work or may be
forced to take a lower-paying job because of decreased mobility,
pain, or other consequences of the injury.13 4 In the case of a child,
the economic consequences are more severe due to a lifetime of
the same consequences. 35 If the victim has no other option for
compensation, he or she is forced to turn to the State. This means
the State could be required to expend substantial resources to
cover the victim's medical treatment, and if the injury is serious
enough, welfare and insurance for the rest of the victim's life. 136 In
sum, in a number of situations the State and taxpayers could end
up paying for the consequences of a defective product. If the state
allowed for the imposition of liability on retailers, such expendi-
tures could be avoided.
B. The Theory of Enterprise Liability Requires the
Internalization of Accident Costs
Instead of placing these costs on the State, the expenses associ-
ated with an injury should be incorporated into the cost of the
product based upon its likelihood of causing injury. In other
words, the riskier the product, the more expensive its purchase
price should be.137 The cost of injury is then placed on those parties
who benefited from the sale of the defective product by either pur-
133. Irma S. Russell, The Logic of Legal Remedies and the Relative Weight of Norms: Assessing
the Public Interest in the Tort Reform Debate, 39 AKRON L. REv. 1053,1064 (2006).
134. Economic Costs of Injuries, supra note 37 ("For many people, the injury causes
temporary pain and inconvenience; for others, the injury leads to suffering, disability,
chronic pain, and a profound change in life circumstances, including substantial financial
consequences. The economic costs of injuries include the costs associated with medical
treatment as well as lost productivity costs, including wages and accompanying fringe bene-
fits and the ability to perform one's normal household responsibilities.").
135. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Services, The
Economic Cost of Injuries to Children and Adolescents (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Economic Costs of Injuries to Children and
Adolescents], available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/CostBook/Cost.ofInjury-
Children.htm ("A childhood injury-related death deprives the world of the child's lifetime of
potential contributions, therefore, productivity losses account for 77% of the total lifetime
costs of injuries for persons aged 0-4 years who were injured in 2000.") (citing ERIC A.
FINKELSTEIN ET AL., INCIDENCE AND ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(2006)).
136. See id.
137. See Henderson, supra note 36, at 1576-77.
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chasing it or profiting from its sale.'m This is the theory of "enter-
prise liability." This doctrine "forces manufacturers to internalize
the accident costs related to their defective products as a cost of
doing business, similar to the manner in which manufacturers
must absorb other production costs, including materials, labor, and
capital."0
39
In a system without liability, buying a "cheaper" product at the
outset is illusory because the cost of potential injury has not been
included in the price. Retailers have not been forced to internalize
these safety costs into the price of a product, so the costs will fall
heavily on those unlucky consumers who are injured by the defec-
tive product.'O' The majority of the population benefits from the
lower price, while the burden is shouldered by both the few who
are injured as well as the State of Michigan, if the State is required
to support the injured.
By holding retailers liable, costs can be spread to all consumers
who purchase the product:141 "Liability causes the financial burdens
of product-related accidents to be included in the prices of poten-
tially harmful products, thereby shifting those burdens to those
who use, consume, and thus directly benefit from, the products in
question." 42 As Justice Roger Traynor said in Escola, "the risk of in-
jury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business.' 43 Although Justice Traynor
explicitly mentions manufacturers, the same logic can be applied
to retailers: the cost imposed on the retailer can be shared among
all consumers.144 Those who are unlucky enough to be a victim of a
138. Williams, supra note 10, at 270 ("Because the manufacturer or that 'enterprise'
benefits from the activity in the form of profits, it is the enterprise, and not the injured con-
sumer, who should bear the costs associated with the products.").
139. Id.
140. Economic Costs of Injury, supra note 37 (discussing the myriad costs of injuries for
a victim).
141. Don Lee & Abigail Goldman, Safer Chinese Products Will Come at a Cost, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2007, at Al ("Now, retailers that had largely dismissed Chinese suppliers' complaints
about the soaring cost of wages, energy and raw materials are preparing to pay manufactur-
ers more to ensure better quality. By doing so, they hope to prevent recalls that hurt their
bottom lines and reputations. But those added costs---on a host of items that include toys
and frozen fish-mean either lower profits for retailers or higher prices for consumers.").
142. Henderson, supra note 36, at 1577.
143. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring).
144. See Henderson, supra note 36, at 1579-80 ("The additional social costs represented
by the uncompensated victim ... or by the manufacturer ... can be reduced by spreading
accident losses among a large number of persons by means of insurance. In general, manu-
facturers are considered better able to obtain insurance than consumers, and are assumed
to be able to pass on most, if not all, of the insurance costs to the consumer by raising the
prices of products.").
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dangerous or deadly defective product should be covered by those
who benefit, the consumers and the retailer who sells it, and not by
the taxpayers and the State.' 45 Liability will allow "the price of
products or activities [to] more nearly... reflect their costs.
14
6
The consequence of reduced retailer liability is that consumers
in Michigan will end up paying more than consumers from other
states for two reasons. First, I have found no evidence to support
the claim that Michigan retailers get a discount on their insurance
protection. Since no other state has reduced retailer liability as
dramatically as Michigan, companies must still recoup insurance
costs, and therefore the prices charged in other states must also be
charged in Michigan. Second, the State of Michigan must expend
more in welfare in order to support those victims who have been
injured by defective products and are unable to recover from the
retailer or manufacturer. As a result, the State has fewer resources
to allocate towards other necessary government functions. Com-
pared to consumers in other states, Michigan's consumers are
disadvantaged from two sides.
Advocates for Michigan retailers will counter that imposing non-
manufacturing retailer liability would reduce their company's prof-
its and increase their costs. 14 7 This would result in the failure of
companies and thereby increase unemployment rates when former
employees are left jobless.4 s The truth, however, is that most states
continue to impose liability on non-manufacturing retailers,4 9 and
since retailers in those states have remained in business, we can
assume that they have continued to operate successfully and prof-
itably. It is therefore possible to maintain both retailer liability and
a healthy business environment. As a result, Michigan has the un-
enviable position of barring compensation for some victims,
without benefiting from prices lower than those set in states where
liability continues to impose higher costs on the retailer."
145. See id.
146. Calabresi, supra note 11, at 722.
147. This is a main argument advanced by advocates of tort reform. See, e.g., La Fetra,
supra note 20, at 648 ("Businesses are devoting more and more resources that could be used
for innovation into defensive measures to protect against the risk of huge verdicts.").
148. Russell, supra note 133, at 1063 ("When large companies fail, the people they em-
ploy may be without work.").
149. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-719 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-314 (1962); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-315 (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-715 (West 2003).
150. For example, tort reform has not reduced the price of insurance premiums in
Michigan. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 68.
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C. Imposing Liability Will Support the American Economy
Re-imposing retailer liability would also be beneficial for the
American economy. American manufacturers who sell products in
the United States are required to spend extra on safety"5' because
they know that they will be held liable for a defective product un-
der state, including Michigan, law. 152 Chinese manufacturers,
however, can disregard safety costs because their government has
protected them from liability 53 and, therefore, they can lower their
prices more easily. 54 This exacerbates the price disparity between
products from American and foreign-based manufacturers.15
Holding retailers liable will force them to put pressure on for-
eign manufacturers to improve the safety of their products.156 If
manufacturers produce safer products, this will raise costs and, by
extension, begin to level the production costs between products
manufactured abroad and those manufactured here. 57 If all manu-
facturers are required to produce safer products, the disparity
between costs to produce a product in the United States and to
produce a product abroad is reduced.'5 Furthermore, based on
their years of experience, American manufacturing companies
should be more proficient at producing safer products than their
counterparts abroad.5 9 At a time when Americans are concerned
about maintaining American jobs, we should do everything we can
to level the playing field for American manufacturers. This is espe-
cially true in Michigan, a state that has been devastated by the most
151. See ATRA, Fact or Fiction, supra note 27 ("Most American-made products are sold
in the United States; some are exported. For that reason, the cost of products made in the
U.S. must factor in the United States system of litigation, which is considerably more expen-
sive than systems in other parts of the world.").
152. MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2947 (2007).
153. Gold, supra note 8 ("The flood of Chinese imports has triggered a growing num-
ber of lawsuits, but individuals and companies often find it impossible to win damages or
other legal redress ... ").
154. Williams, supra note 10, at 271. ("If a manufacturer produces a more dangerous
product but is not subject to strict liability, then that manufacturer will not be forced to
internalize the accident costs associated with its products, and the price of those products
will not increase.").
155. See Peter S. Goodman, When Foreigners Buy the Factory: 2 Towns, Opposite Paths, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at Al (quoting Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm as stating that
manufacturers in Michigan told her that "[tihere is nothing you can do to compensate for
the fact that we are able to pay $1.57 an hour in Mexico").
156. See Lee & Goldman, supra note 141.
157. Id.
158. Williams, supra note 10, at 271.
159. American companies were first held liable through two early product liability cases.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
ling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
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recent downturn in the economy.16° One way we can do this is by
requiring that all products, whether produced at home or abroad,
be held to the similar standards of liability.
Furthermore, the current system for consumer protection is al-
ready costly for the economy and would benefit from reform.
Today, when the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission de-
termines that a product is defective and dangerous, it recalls the
product.' 6' The Department of Health and Human Services, how-
ever, has found that a recall is not effective at protecting
consumers. 62 Furthermore, a recall is incredibly expensive for the
retailer. The costs associated with a recall are so expensive, and the
chance of a recall great enough, that companies are now seeking
insurance to specifically cover these costs."' Increased liability on
retailers would help alleviate the problems with the recall system: it
would decrease the necessity to pay for a recall by encouraging
safer products. 64 Fewer recalls would bring down the price of recall
160. John Gallagher, Michigan Prepares for Next Financial Challenge: With Aid Approved,
State Readies for a Cultural Shift, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 22, 2008, at Al ("The state has
seen eight consecutive years of job loss and over the past year has led or been near the top
among states in unemployment....").-
161. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html (last visited May 14, 2009).
162. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, RECALL EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH: A RE-
VIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE ON CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR (2003),
(on file with the University of Michigan journal of Law Reform) available at http://
www.cpsc.gov/LIBRARY/FOIA/FOIA03/os/RecallEffectiveness.pdf (report prepared by XL
Associates & Heiden Associates) (compiling the literature and presenting several problems
which impede the effectiveness of product recalls, including how to communicate with the
purchasers of defective products and how to motivate those purchasers to stop using the
recalled product and/or return the product).
163. James M. Davis, Risks Made in China: Manufacturers Love China Because the Chinese
Make Products More Cheaply than Just About Anyone Else, RISK & INSURANCE, Jan. 2008 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m0BJK/is-1-19/ain24239640 ("[I]nsurance coverage [i]s
the primary bulwark against losses caused by product recalls or third-party liability suits
stemming from the sale or incorporation of faulty imported goods.").
164. This idea that retailer liability encourages better products is posited as an argu-
ment for retailers supplying all types of products, not just consumer goods. See, e.g., Kenneth
E. Spahn, Service Warranty Associations: Regulating Service Contracts as "Insurance" Under Florida's
Chapter 634, 25 STETSON L. REV. 597, 625 (1996) ("If, however, retailers are held ultimately
responsible for the 'products' . . they sell, they will demand greater assurance of future
performance by their suppliers .... "); Rachel B. Adler, Comment, Device Dilemma: Should
Hospitals be Strictly Liable for Retailing Defective Surgical Devices , 5 ALa. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 95, 129
(1994) ("[R]etailer liability on hospitals would give manufacturers an even greater induce-
ment to produce safer products."); Laura Pleicones, Note, Passing the Essence Test: Health Care
Providers Escape Strict Liability for Medical Devices, 50 S.C. L. REv. 463, 485 (1999) ("A retailer
can simply refuse to buy a product that has not been thoroughly tested or that poses a
known risk. In that sense, the retailer does have control over a product, even though it may
not participate directly in its manufacture.").
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insurance, thereby improving the economic position of American
companies.
D. Liability Will Deter the Production and Consumption
of Dangerous Products
Deterrence is an essential reason to re-establish retailer liability.
Richard Primus, a legal scholar, writes:
One of the chief functions of law is to influence behavior, and
much of our understanding of law assumes that most people
will seek to conform their conduct to what the law requires,
whether from a sense of simple obligation or because the sys-
tem of legal incentives and deterrents makes it instrumentally
rational for them to do so.165
Furthermore, the tort system, "by standing ready to impose finan-
cial consequences after the fact if an actor causes an unreasonable
harm ... operates to influence behavior before the harm ever oc-
curs.
" 166
The tort system works to deter in two different ways. First, it en-
courages manufacturers and producers to seek out safer products
in order to reduce their costs in compensation by "creat[ing] the
financial incentive for manufacturers to find more cost-effective
ways to reduce or eliminate product risks."1 67 Second, it encourages
consumers to pick out safer products by making safer products
cheaper: when a retailer is "held strictly liable for the injuries their
products cause, those enterprises will have to pay compensation to
victims or higher insurance premiums, which they will then pass on
to consumers in the form of increased prices for their products."6
The more dangerous the product, the higher the price required to
reimburse the manufacturer and/or retailer for the compensation
the manufacturer and/or retailer will subsequently have to pay out
to injured victims. The "natural tendency of consumers" is to
choose the safer, and cheaper, product. 69 As a result, retailers pro-
vide safer products and victims seek out safer products, thereby
decreasing the risk of injury.
165. Richard A. Primus, BolingAlone, 104 COLUM. L. Rav. 975, 1010 (2004).
166. Center for Progressive Reform, supra note 31.
167. Henderson, supra note 36, at 1579.
168. Williams, supra note 10, at 270-71.
169. Id. at 271.
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Advocates for tort reform counter that "freedom-loving Ameri-
cans should be entitled to make choices about the level of safety
risk they are willing to accept" and "individuals must be allowed to
assess what risks they are willing to assume, even if they are willing
to accept more risk than the courts or legislature deems pru-
dent.""" This "assumption of risk" argument was first articulated by
Justice Colin Blackburn in Fletcher v. Rylands. 7' In that case, Justice
Blackburn argued that where "circumstances were such as to show
that the plaintiff had taken the risk upon himself' there should be
no liability imposed on another. 72 Since the consumer purchased
the defective product and presumably decided not to insure him-
self or herself to cover the costs of an injury, tort reform advocates
argue that he or she assumed the risk of injury and therefore
should bear the cost.
This argument, however, fails to recognize that consumers often
have no way of knowing whether a product is likely to be unsafe or
defective. The average person cannot tell whether a toy train is
decorated with a lead-based paint or whether pet food is tainted
with poison. Consumers may intend to buy the safest product they
can find, but without the knowledge and resources required to de-
termine which product is actually safer, they are unable to assess
the level of risk they are assuming by purchasing a certain prod-
uct.1
73
Generally speaking, the cost for a single consumer to investigate
the risks of any given product, before purchase, would be astro-
nomical. The consumer would have to either conduct a costly
search for reliable information on the product or hire someone to
do the investigatory work. It would be much cheaper to impose this
cost on the retailer. Retailers are able to make such inquiries them-
selves, pay someone else to make them, or insist upon consumer
protection by purchasing indemnity insurance as a cost of doing
business.7 4 When negotiating major contracts, retailers can estab-
lish baseline safety requirements and proof that those
requirements are met. 75 If needed, they are also capable of staffing
170. La Fetra, supra note 20, at 645-46, 663; see also Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict
Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 873 (1982) (discussing the arguments for and against
applying the assumption of risk doctrine to strict products liability).
171. Fletcher v. Rylands, I L.R. Exch. 265 (1866).
172. Id. at 286.
173. Calabresi, supra note 11, at 726 ("The first reason for the difference is that one of
the two actors may, in practice, be far better able than the other to evaluate the accident
risk, that is, the expected accident costs. And if this is the case, his activity is the more suit-
able one, in terms of deterrence of accident-prone activities, to bear the initial loss.").
174. Williams, supra note 10, at 270.
175. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, supra note 12.
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safety departments and making them responsible for ensuring and
testing the safety of products they intend to sell.176 The cost for this
type of inquiry is prohibitive for the average consumer and fur-
thermore, it would be extremely difficult for consumers to work
together in order to share the assessment of risks. 77 A retailer,
however, can spread these costs over all of the products he or his
trade group sells. 78 To make this cost more manageable, a retailer
could also collaborate on safety issues with other retailers or lobby
the government to assume the burden of ensuring safety. Justice
Richard Posner, a tort scholar who emphasizes the importance of
cost-efficient tort liability, acknowledges that in a case where either
party:
could have prevented the accident ... [and] the cost of pre-
vention to the injurer would have been lower than the cost of
prevention to the victim[, t]he correct economizing rule... is
to make the injurer liable, even though the victim may be said
to have been contributorily negligent.'
7 9
This is an argument that has also been supported by Judge Guido
Calabresi, a high-profile jurist and an expert in tort and economic
policy, since the 1960s.8
As Justice Traynor remarked in one of the fundamental cases on
product liability, Escola v. Coca-Coca Bottling Company, "public policy
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effec-
tively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market."'' Since consumers are unable to
respond to deterrence where they are unable to assess the risks, the
liability must be placed on retailers and manufacturers who are
able to respond to these deterrent incentives. 8'
176. Id.
177. Calabresi, supra note 11, at 731 ("[T]here are many situations in which artificial
bargaining is even theoretically impossible because one group of 'bargainers' cannot be
organized without some degree of outside coercion.").
178. Henderson, supra note 36, at 1577.
179. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 40 (1972).
180. Id. at 30 n.1.
181. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring).
182. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
sis 180 (1970) (stating that deterrence does not work where costs are externalized "due to
inadequate knowledge"); Calabresi, supra note 11, at 729 ("The best we can do, then, in a
bargaining situation is to place the original cost on the party to the bargain whose actuarial
class can best evaluate the risk of... costs in the future.").
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E. Litigation Helps Publicize Dangerous Products
The tort system has another often overlooked benefit: imposing
liability on manufacturers and retailers encourages the dissemina-
tion of information regarding the product, and often publicizes
the risk of a defective product before it would otherwise be no-
ticed.8 3 This supports the theory that retailers should be held
liable, as well as manufacturers, because when a manufacturer
cannot be reached, and retailer liability does not exist, the plaintiff
may be unable to find a lawyer to take the case because there is lit-
tle chance of recovery.184 Consequently, the information about the
defective product will likely become public later than it would have
through beginning a public product liability action. In contrast,
when a retailer can be held liable, the lawsuit will move forward,
the lawyer for the plaintiff will hire experts in the field to present
testimony at trial, and valuable information about defective prod-
ucts will be presented in a public forum. This second scenario not
only helps the individual harmed, but also other consumers, who
are then able to make more responsible choices about the prod-
ucts they purchase.
F Duty And Morality Require Retailers to Compensate Victims
Finally, many argue that the retailer has assumed a duty toward
the public by placing goods for sale:
[T]he public has the right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon
by the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods; that public policy demands that the burden of acciden-
tal injuries caused by products intended for consumption be
placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost
of production against which liability insurance can be ob-
tained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to
the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the
183. David Partlett, Of Law Reform Lions and the Limits of Tort Reform, 27 SYDNEY L. REV.
417,425-26 (2005) ("The strong remedial American torts system has produced considerable
information about injuries and illnesses caused by toxic substances and defective prod-
ucts.").
184. Id. at 427 ("Supercompensatory damages encourage attorneys, as bounty hunters,
to root out harm-producing behavior, bringing malefactors to book.").
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proper persons to afford it are those who market the prod-
ucts. 
185
In other words, the non-manufacturing seller owes a duty to the
public. A retailer, just like the manufacturer, benefits from the sale
of a product to the consumer. It seems both fair and just that such
a benefit would also create a duty on the part of both the manufac-
turer and the retailer to ensure that the product being presented
to the public is safe.
An empirical analysis of the public policy reasons behind the use
of the strict liability doctrine shows that this sense of duty and fair-
ness is an important factor in the opinions written by many
judges.1 16 Our innate sense of fairness requires us to hold retailers
accountable.
V. CONCLUSION
Victims who are injured by a defective product deserve to re-
ceive compensation. Repealing or re-interpreting § 2947 will allow
Michigan victims to recover from retailers more easily. As a result,
when a defective imported product injures an individual, he or she
will be able to seek relief directly from the retailer and, where pos-
sible, from the manufacturer. As discussed, this system will produce
safer products for the majority of consumers, prevent the State
from allocating scarce public resources to cover the victim's costs,
level the playing field for Michigan manufacturers and allocate the
risks of purchasing cheaper products to all those who benefit from
them rather than allowing the occasional victim to bear the entire
cost alone. This system is more economical, and more just, than
Michigan's current law. The need for reform on this issue is ur-
gent.
If Michigan decides to reinstate liability against retailers, the
next question becomes how such liability will be enforced and what
compensation victims will receive. Academics and policy pundits
continue to debate the advantages and disadvantages of compensa-
tion: whether liability on retailers should be imposed only in cases
where the manufacturer cannot be reached, 87 whether victims
185. Arnold, supra note 13, at 182 (quoting O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248, 251-
52 (Ariz. 1968)).
186. Henderson, supra note 36, at 1575..
187. Sachs, supra note 101, at 1035.
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should receive economic and/or noneconomic damages,"' and
how much liability should be placed on which of the players. 89 The
method for remedying victims is beyond the scope of this Note.
This Note argues that non-manufacturing retailer liability, in some
form, is essential. However, it does not attempt to argue how this
liability should be imposed. There are many public policy factors
that must be considered in determining how to allocate a victim's
compensation, and therefore, the legislature is the appropriate
place for these factors to be balanced and considered.
Tort reform appears to have a permanent place in modern po-
litical discourse. As discussed infra Part I, tort reform appeals to
voters for many reasons. One academic who studies tort reform,
Sandra Gavin, writes that the "rhetoric of the reform movement
itself plays a major role in shaping public opinion and in thwarting
further judicial expansion of [tort liability]."' 9' She argues that the
tort reform movement has used "assertive rhetoric" and fear to
support its argument, rather than solid logic.'9' She says:
Stealth tort reform operates to manipulate public perception
about the state of the law without regard to truth or logic. It is
not directed toward promoting social justice other than to
'change perceptions of what the common good ought to be.'
Most importantly, stealth tort reform is not interested in truth;
unlike common law, it persuades through assertive rhetoric
and not through the give-and-take of orderly proof and argu-
ment, but through manipulation of images and ideas.'
9 2
As a result, proponents of tort reform have created fears of increas-
ing medical costs and the loss of business and engendered a
perception of sneaky lawyers and lazy victims who are looking to
make money off hard-working entrepreneurs.
93
Although Gavin does not intend to posit whether tort reform is
actually advantageous, she questions whether this type of market-
ing is disadvantageous to the public.'9 4 It hides the real arguments
and, as a result, the public could make poor choices without the
188. Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort
Law, 57 SMU L. REv. 163, 164 (2004) (arguing generally that pain and suffering damages
should not be awarded in tort claims, but also discussing the history of pain and suffering
damages).
189. Sachs, supra note 101, at 1035.
190. Sandra E Gavin, Stealth Tort Reform, 42 VAL. U. L. REv. 431, 432 (2008).
191. Id. at 441,448.
192. Id. at 441.
193. See id. at 446-50.
194. See id. at 458-59.
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benefit of understanding the reasoning behind the arguments.' 95
The recent chain of events in Michigan lends credibility to Gavin's
thesis. As discussed infra Part II.D, Michigan voters allowed the leg-
islature and the judiciary to expand tort reform without regard to
the consequences. As a result, Michigan victims have few means of
compensation for injuries from Chinese-made defective products.
This potential outcome was not discussed when Michigan's tort
reform measures were enacted. Michigan's laws, when coupled
with our globalizing economy, leave the state's citizens open to an
increased risk of injury without a means of recovery.
Americans are unlikely to return to purchasing only American-
made products in the near future. As a result, consumer-victims
must be able to recover damages if they are the unfortunate victims
of a dangerous or deadly defective product manufactured abroad.
As Russell writes, "[t]he incentive of damages serves a much larger
purpose than simply compensating the individual victims of negli-
,,196 igence. Liability is a "reflection of [a] goal or value that society
seeks"197 and allowing victims to sue the retailer in addition to the
manufacturer furthers our societal goals. The result is the "most
beneficial for the most people," and therefore adheres to "[o] ne of
the most dominant goals of tort law ... social utility."'98 It places
the costs on the party who is best able remedy the situation. It de-
ters retailers from selling defective products and encourages the
retailer to be responsible in choosing safer products. It ultimately
benefits all of society by producing fewer injuries, reducing medi-
cal costs, and increasing worker productivity by keeping would-be
victims in the economy.199
Russell writes that the "net result" of tort liability "may be greater
costs for actors in the world but lower costs to society as a whole, by
virtue of the costs saved in terms of the injuries and pain and suf-
fering avoided by enhanced safety."2 0 Our justice system should
strive for this goal and reinstating retailer product liability in
Michigan will advance it. If for no other reason, we should allow
recovery for the unfortunate few who must pay the cost of allowing
the rest of us to benefit from the economic choice of choosing
cheaper products. If Michigan reinstates non-manufacturing
195. See id.
196. Russell, supra note 133, at 1065.
197. Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal
About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 259, 286-87 (2008).
198. Id. at 289.
199. See Economic Costs of Injuries, supra note 37; Economic Cost of Injuries to Chil-
dren and Adolescents, supra note 135.
200. Russell, supra note 133, at 1060.
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retailer liability, not only will risk be carried by all of those who
benefit from cheaper prices, but the price of goods will also rise to
accurately reflect the full cost of the product, including potential
injuries it might cause. Under the present interpretation of the law,
those of us who are not injured benefit from cheap prices, while
the few who are severely injured suffer greatly. A new interpreta-
tion of § 2947 will allow those who are injured to have, at the very
least, the comfort of knowing that their injuries and damages will
be compensated.
